Here is an overview of what I am currently working on. I have drafts of most of the papers and am happy to send them upon request.
Book Project: Aristotle’s Theory of Hylomorphism in Metaphysics H
For Aristotle, metaphysics is concerned with what fundamentally exists, and since substance is the primary kind of being, metaphysics is, ultimately, the study of substance. In the middle books of the Metaphysics, ZHΘ, Aristotle investigates hylomorphic substances, that is, composites of form and matter. Although the doctrine of hylomorphism is one of Aristotle’s pivotal contributions to philosophy and has seen a revival in modern-day metaphysics, it has proven difficult to spell it out precisely: What is the nature of form? Is matter itself an individual? If material substances are composites of form and matter, how can they be genuine unities?
In my book, I seek to demonstrate that it is book H as a whole that presents Aristotle’s most mature theory of hylomorphic substance. My main objectives are:
- To establish that book H (VIII), not books Z (VII) and Θ (IX), contains Aristotle’s authoritative account of hylomorphic substance.
- To show that book H, and indeed of books Z and H as a whole, answer not the particular question “What is primary substance?” but the general question “What is substance?”
- To demonstrate that Aristotle answers the latter question by showing how, and in what sense, form, matter, and the composite are substances, and that he does so by developing a novel conception of hylomorphism in book H.
- To argue that this novel conception of hylomorphism is based on Aristotle’s theory of scientific definitions but requires, vis-à -vis book Z, a re-interpretation of matter and form; and finally,
- To clarify whether the foregoing considerations imply that Aristotle proposed two different models of hylomorphism.
These objectives point to the likelihood:
- That book H is not a set of unconnected discussions but presents one continuous argument.
- That book Z does not propose a theory of substance but deals with general, logical concepts and theorems connected to the notion of substance.
- That the assumptions are wrong that book H continues the inquiry from book Z without a significant methodological difference, and that book H clarifies the notion of matter while book Z analyzes the concept of form.
- That book Θ does not elaborate on H’s treatment of substance but, on the contrary, relies on it.
Papers on Aristotle’s Metaphysics
Metaphysik H (in German)
In this article, I present an analysis of the overall argument of Book H of Aristotle. It is forthcoming in C. Rapp (ed.), Aristoteles: Metaphysik. Die Substanzbücher Zeta, Eta, Theta, Akademie Verlag.
Aristotle on the Definition of Hylomorphic Substances
Since a hylomorphic substance is a this-in-that, a specific form in a certain matter, it is natural to assume that its definition must include both the form and the matter. However, this is by no means the standard view when we come to Metaphysics Z. In an influential paper, Michael Frede argued that “in the sense of ‘definition’ which Aristotle relies on, e.g., in the Metaphysics, the definition even of natural substances is solely in terms of form” (Frede 1990, 114). Two reasons support this claim. First, according to the unity constraint on strict definability in Z.4–6, a definition may not involve a predication in which one thing is said of something that is different in being (allo kat’allou predication), and since a hylomorphic composite consists of two distinct components it cannot be defined. Second, since the essence is the ontological correlate of the definition, and the essence is identified with the form, it follows that the definition of something is made solely in terms of its form.
In this paper, I will argue against both assumptions and maintain that the intuition we started with – that the definition must include both form and matter – is correct. I want to show that, from Z.17 onwards, Aristotle is concerned with establishing that hylomorphic substances do meet the constraints on definability from Z.4–6. Although hylomorphic substances involve form being predicated of matter (ti kata tinos predication), this kind of predication does not involve one thing being said of another thing. Second, I will suggest that, starting with Z.17, Aristotle uses a narrower notion of essence, where an essence explains why the matter constitutes a substance, as opposed to stating what it is for a substance to be the substance it is. On the narrower notion, the essence is not the ontological correlate of the definition but only part of it. Accordingly, the complete definition of a hylomorphic substance will include both form and matter.
The Project of Metaphysics α
In this paper, I argue that Aristotle’s Metaphysics α is an introduction to physics. Though this view was already defended in 1912 by Jaeger on the basis of α.3, it found few supporters because Jaeger, and those following him, did not explain how α.1–2 fit with this interpretation, and thus failed to make sense of α as a unity. By contrast, my argument for the unity of α is based on a new interpretation of the purpose of α.1–2, which I base on the distinction between the manner (tropos) of a science and its content. Knowing the manner is part of the education (paideia) one must have acquired before engaging in any scientific endeavor. Accordingly, α.1 is not an introduction to any specific science but rather describes an epistemic ideal as part of a general education in the theoretical sciences; α.2 defends the possibility of this epistemic ideal; and α.3 closes the paideia part and announces the topic of what was being introduced, namely, physics.
Other Papers
The account of quantity in Categories 6
If one studies the Ancient commentaries on Categories 6, there is a mismatch between what Aristotle actually says and what the Ancient commentators think Aristotle implied. Modern-day interpreters have the same tendency, although they are more scrupulous to go beyond what is explicit in the text. One instance of this mismatch centers around the question of the ontological status of quantities. As has been noted by commentators, Aristotle begins his discussion in Categories with a classification of what appears to be owners of quantitative properties — lines, surfaces, bodies, time, place, number, and speech — as opposed to quantitative properties themselves, such as 5-feet. Aristotle himself gives no indication of how these owners fit into his categorial scheme. Commentators responded to this problem in several ways. Some ancient commentators, e.g. Ammonius, devised an elaborate metaphysical theory about how prime matter is endowed with the three-dimensions and, thus, becomes a second substrate. Ackrill and Oehler, who wrote the two main modern-day commentaries in English and German, respectively, state the problem but offer no clear solution. My aim in this paper is to revisit this problem and make some headway towards a satisfactory account of the items that Aristotle classifies in Categories 6.
A Puzzle for Aristotle’s Causal Account of Thinking
Aristotle has a causal account of thinking. Thinking is, as he repeatedly emphasizes, a being affected by the object of thought. Thus, my thinking of something is to be explained by the fact that my intellect (nous) has been affected by the object of thought. The object of thought is the cause which acts upon the intellect I have. Commentators typically assume that Aristotle speaks loosely and metaphorically here. In the first part of my paper, I will argue that this is not so. Thus, the puzzle Aristotle raises at the end of DA III.4 the question of how thinking can be a being affected, if it ‘has nothing in common with anything else’ (DA III.4 429b22), is genuine. It cannot be solved by insisting on the ‘strained meaning’ of the terms because Aristotle relies in the first part of de An. III.4 429a10-29 on the causal account of thinking to deduce the characteristics of the intellect, most famously that its sole nature is being in capacity (429a21-22) and that it is nothing in actuality before thinks (429a24). Therefore, for the deduction to be sound it must be literally true to say that the intellect is affected by the objects of thoughts. However, if the intellect is nothing in actuality before it thinks, how can the causal claim be literally true?
If this is the puzzle, what is Aristotle’s solution? Aristotle develops his answer to the puzzle in terms of the pair dunamis and energeia. The core of Aristotle’s account of causality can, I will argue, be captured by these concepts and Aristotle himself uses these concepts for a general account of causality. Thus, we can give content to a causal theory of thinking, even though, as I will argue, the account of thinking pushes Aristotle’s causal model to its boundaries.