EXTENSION OF STATE POWER IN KARAMOJA

Part 1: The Objectives of the Ugandan State Managers in Karamoja

Karol Czuba
Graduate Associate, CCDS
University of Toronto Scarborough
Extension of State Power in Karamoja
Part 1: The Objectives of the Ugandan State Managers in Karamoja

CCDS Working Paper No. 3, July 2017

Karol Czuba
Graduate Associate, CCDS

Introduction

Karamoja, in northeastern Uganda, has occupied a marginal position within the country since its incorporation into the British-controlled Uganda Protectorate in the early twentieth century. Culturally, economically, and politically distinct from the rest of Uganda, for most of this period the restive and often violent region elicited little interest from the country’s colonial and postcolonial rulers. The efforts that successive governments undertook to address Karamoja’s poverty and limit conflict were generally half-hearted and ineffectual. At the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the Ugandan state’s attitude towards the region changed radically. In 2006, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government of President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni launched a brutal, but highly effective disarmament campaign, which has not only successfully reduced conflict in the region, but also led to thoroughgoing extension of the presence, and power, of the Ugandan state in the previously neglected region.

Many aspects of the disarmament process, especially the widespread human rights violations committed by the Ugandan army, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), have been extensively documented by scholars. None of them has examined, however, the causes of the abrupt change of the government’s position towards Karamoja that manifested itself in disarmament. The subsequent extension of the power of the Ugandan state in the region has also attracted little scholarly attention. In this working paper, I endeavour to address these important gaps in the literature. In Part 1, I investigate the objectives of Uganda’s rulers, to whom I refer as “state-managers,” and the ways in which disarmament and other policies implemented by the
Ugandan government in Karamoja have contributed to the realization of those objectives. I argue that, in the absence of perceived or real challenges to their continued control of the Ugandan state, the state managers initiated the process of extension of state power in the region with the intention of enriching themselves through exploitation of Karamoja’s natural resources. In Part 2 (Czuba 2017), I consider the interactions between the state managers and the emergent Karamojan political elite; in particular, I examine the role that that the cooptation of this new elite has played in state managers’ efforts to establish control over Karamoja and benefit from the region’s natural resources. The paper is based on field research conducted in Kampala and in Amudat, Moroto, and Nakapiripirit districts between October and December 2016.3

Overview

The majority of Karamoja’s ethnically heterogeneous population belongs to three Ateker ethnic groups, the Dodoth, Jie, and Karimojong, who are jointly commonly referred to as the Karamojong. The Karamojong share the region with a number of other ethnic groups, the largest of which are the Ethur and Pokot.4 These primarily (agro)pastoralist groups5 settled in the territory that is now Karamoja in the centuries preceding its incorporation into the Uganda Protectorate in the early twentieth century. Concerned by the accumulation of firearms (introduced a few decades earlier by Abyssinian and Swahili expeditions, whose members also gave the region its current name) in the hands of the restive local population, the Protectorate authorities successfully disarmed Karamojans in the period leading to 1921 (Knighton 1990; Olowo Onyango 2010). In order to consolidate power without inordinate expense, they instituted a system of indirect rule presided over by newly appointed “tribal” chiefs. With these officials’ support, the colonial authorities limited (but never eradicated) cattle raiding and gun ownership in the Karamoja District. The British had no desire, however, to invest heavily in the region
which, apart from the short-lived ivory trade, presented few economic opportunities (Barber 1968; Gray 2000). Their half-hearted efforts to promote missionary activity, school attendance, and sedentary settlement proved largely unsuccessful. The region was largely left to its own devices as—in Cisternino’s scathing assessment—a “human zoo” (Cisternino 1979; also Barber 1968; Dyson-Hudson 1966; Gray 2000; Knighton 1990; Mirzeler and Young 2000; Olowo Onyango 2010; UO4).

The limited developmental initiatives undertaken by the colonial authorities did not satisfy the first government of independent Uganda, headed by Milton Obote. The new administration, formed at independence in 1962, was determined to resolve the problem of the region’s “backwardness,” or the “Karamoja problem” identified by the modernizing Bataringaya Commission established to prepare Uganda for self-rule. The Obote government’s efforts, which focused on livestock disease control, commercialization of livestock production, sedentarization, and establishment of education and health facilities, failed, however, to yield the intended results (Knighton, 1990; Mirzeler and Young, 2000; UO2; cf. Mamdani 1996). Instead, cattle raiding and interethnic conflict increased in Karamoja, facilitated by the flow of arms from neighbouring countries and the production of homemade guns in Karamoja itself. Exasperated with these signs of the Karamojans’ noncompliance with its modernizing policies, the government became increasingly heavy-handed. Idi Amin’s government, in power after 1971, continued its predecessor regime’s brutality; in 1975, as many as three-hundred Bokora were massacred by Ugandan soldiers at Nawaikorot (Gray, 2000; Mirzeler and Young, 2000; Mosebo 2015b; Olowo Onyango, 2010; UO2).

Following the collapse of the Amin government in April 1979, Ugandan soldiers stationed at the barracks in Kotido and Moroto, Karamoja’s largest towns, fled in fear of
reprisals for their brutal treatment of the local population. The arms depot in Moroto was promptly looted by the Matheniko, a section of the Karimojong, who acquired approximately 12,000 weapons. At the same time, the Jie obtained the contents of the smaller armoury in Kotido. In the following year, Karamoja was hit by a serious drought, which led to a famine that resulted in the deaths of as many as 50,000 people. The newly armed Jie and Matheniko raided their weaker neighbours, stripping them of their cattle. In response, other Karamojan groups rearmed themselves in the course of the subsequent decade. The 1980s, 1990s, and the first half of the 2000s saw essentially uninterrupted raiding by different Karamojan groups of their neighbours both within the region and in adjacent areas of Uganda (Acholi, Lango, Teso) (Gray et al. 2003; Knighton 2006; Mirzeler and Young 2000; Olowo Onyango 2010; Stites et al. 2007; UO5). Incessant conflict affected many aspects of Karamojans’ lives, including their customary governance arrangements, although the reality and extent of these changes have been forcefully debated (Eaton 2010a and 2010b; Gray 2000; Knighton 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2010; Mirzeler and Young 2000; Mirzeler 2007; Mkutu 2010; Stites et al. 2007).

At the same time, the Ugandan state also lost its tenuous hold on Karamoja. Subsequent governments of Milton Obote (who regained power in 1979) and Yoweri Museveni (after 1986) made unenthusiastic efforts to re-establish control over the region through disarmament initiatives launched in 1984, 1987, 2001-2002, and 2004-2006. Encumbered by inadequate financial and political commitment, these initiatives ended in failure, underscoring both the continuing weakness of the Ugandan state in Karamoja and its lack of interest in the region (Bevan 2008). These actions also further alienated the Karamojans, who had long been suspicious of the Ugandan state (Knighton 2003).
The operations of the Ugandan army, after 1995 known as the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), were characterized by extensive brutality and violations of human rights (Gray et al. 2003). The government’s more peaceable actions were hardly preferable. The initially non-coercive 2001 disarmament initiative was relatively well planned and coordinated with local leaders and communities. As a result, members of the Bokora section of the Karimojong voluntarily surrendered as much as forty-four percent of their arms; their Dodoth and Jie cousins gave up to twenty-two and twenty-seven percent, respectively, of the weapons in their possession (Bevan 2008). These successes proved, however, short-lived. Dissatisfied with the slow pace of the process, the UPDF soon turned to coercive measures (again resulting in widespread human rights violations) before relocating most of its soldiers to northern Uganda in a response to a Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) offensive. Without UPDF protection, the newly disarmed communities were vulnerable to attack from their neighbours; soon afterwards the Bokora were essentially stripped of their cattle (Bevan 2008; Czuba 2012; Human Rights Watch 2007; UA4; UO127). The subsequent voluntary disarmament scheme launched in 2004 unsurprisingly attracted little support from Karamojans, with only 1,697 guns collected by April 2006 (Human Rights Watch 2007). As the failure of that disarmament drive became apparent, the Ugandan government abruptly changed its attitude towards Karamoja. Its next initiative would definitively bring the restive region under its heel.

**Disarmament**

In May 2006, President Museveni directed the UPDF to commence forcible “cordon and search” disarmament operations. In contrast to previous initiatives, the new disarmament drive was backed by strong political commitment and financial resources sufficient to deploy tens of thousands of military personnel (perhaps as many as 50,000-60,000) to Karamoja for an
extended period of time (UO58). The UPDF had achieved most of its objectives by 2010, although disarmament operations continue in a reduced form to this day. By 2012, 30,000 out of the estimated 50,000 guns in Karamojans’ possession had been confiscated (IRIN News 2012). For the first time since the colonial era, large-scale raiding in Karamoja had ceased. Effectively under military occupation, Karamoja was firmly in government hands (Howe, Stites, and Akabwai 2015; KE401; UO1; UO2; UO119). Since then, stability has been ensured by collective punishment mechanisms enforced by UPDF soldiers, whose continuing presence is also necessary to protect Karamojans from attacks by the still armed neighbouring communities in Kenya and South Sudan (Howe, Stites, and Akabwai 2015; UA4; UO5). From the government’s perspective, disarmament has, therefore, been an unqualified success. Both for Karamojans and for the Ugandan state, its cost has, however, been very high.

In the course of disarmament, the UPDF routinely committed serious human rights violations. These abuses have been relatively well documented. In Appendix 1, I present a list of incidents recorded in the scholarly literature, United Nations and non-governmental organization reports, and the media. Although fragmentary, the data permit a cautious estimation of the number of victims of human rights abuses committed by Ugandan military personnel in Karamoja: at the very least around one thousand, and conceivably several thousand deaths and many thousands of cases of beating, injury, sexual violence, torture, displacement, and extrajudicial detention can be attributed to the UPDF.

Disarmament also directly contributed to the erosion of pastoral livelihood practices. Many Karamojans lost their livestock not only to armed neighbours, but also to the UPDF. There is considerable evidence that UPDF officers, some of them high-ranking (such as the former UPDF 3rd Division Commander Colonel Sula Semakula), were involved in theft of cattle, which
they either sold or transported to their homes in Western Uganda (Mkutu 2010; UO5; UO58). In addition, confiscation of guns and creation of livestock kraals by the UPDF restricted mobility, on which Karamojan pastoralists’ livelihoods had previously depended, further contributing to the weakening of pastoralism in the region.

The cost of disarmament was also high for the Ugandan state. First, local resistance to the brutality of UPDF operations led to deaths of military personnel. According to the UPDF, 269 of its soldiers were killed and 289 injured in Karamoja between 2001 and 2011 (Kolyangha 2011). These figures almost certainly understate the real number of UPDF casualties. Second, although the Ugandan government has never disclosed the financial cost of disarmament, especially following the cessation of hostilities in northern Uganda in 2006 the UPDF operations in Karamoja consumed a significant proportion of the security sector budget, which in the mid-2000s constituted approximately ten percent of the country’s overall budget (Kuteesa et al. 2006). Furthermore, and third, the human rights violations committed by the UPDF in 2006 and 2007 attracted considerable scrutiny from human rights agencies representing the international community that provides the Ugandan government with foreign aid on which it depends to fund its operation (Human Rights Watch 2007; OHCHR 2006, 2007, and 2013).

Exploring the objectives of Ugandan state managers

Coming after decades of apparent lack of interest in Karamoja and its inhabitants, the Ugandan government’s determination to effect disarmament in the region despite its high cost and the possibility of negative repercussions represented an abrupt policy reversal. The scholarly literature, which has extensively documented the disarmament process, has not, however, investigated the causes of this shift.
As I demonstrate in subsequent paragraphs, the standard explanation of disarmament articulated by government officials and supporters of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime is incorrect. This explanation emphasizes President Museveni’s supposedly deeply held and longstanding desire to end conflict in Karamoja and alleviate its inhabitants’ poverty. Its proponents point to the NRM’s Ten-Point Programme and to the government’s earlier efforts in Karamoja. The Ten-Point Programme was developed during the civil war, from which the NRM emerged victorious in 1986, and articulated the NRM’s post-war plans. A section of Point 8 declares:

The Karamajong people have suffered a lot at the hands of various post-independence governments. Settling these people, according to our investigation when we were in the UNLF government, is not at all difficult. One of the crucial elements should be the provision of water. Karamoja being a dry country, people will be attracted to these water points and government can use that opportunity to reach them. International aid agencies could help in this aspect (National Resistance Movement 1986).

The intention of settling the “Karamajong” is in line with the unenthusiastic sedentarization efforts previously pursued in Karamoja by the colonial and earlier post-independence governments (Sundal 2009). More tellingly, the document reflects the NRM’s desire for economic, political, and social homogenization of Uganda (UO119). The establishment of a dedicated Ministry for Karamoja Affairs within the Office of the Prime Minister was one component of its strategy. More importantly, however, realization of the NRM’s objectives required peace and stability.

To this end, the NRM government launched its first disarmament campaign in Karamoja as early as in 1987, only a year after its victory in the civil war (UO1; UO114; UO119; UO122). However, “when Museveni took over in 1986, he wanted to use the same rudimentary approach as Obote and Amin, and he had it rough. A lot of soldiers were killed [by the Karamojans—KC]”
In response, the National Resistance Army (as the UPDF was known until 1995) committed a series of human rights violations, leading to intensification of Karamojans’ hostility towards the government (Gray et al. 2003, S15). Subsequently, conflict continued largely unabated and no significant disarmament initiatives were undertaken until the early 2000s. Those early interactions between the NRM government and Karamojans suggest, therefore, that the region was not high on Museveni’s agenda.

The standard explanation of the puzzle of the timing of the NRM government’s prioritization of disarmament of Karamoja emphasizes the pressing challenges that the government has faced for much of its existence. The narrative’s proponents argue that these challenges kept the government from extending control into the region. Indeed, the NRM’s civil war victory led to the initiation of the war in northern Uganda and a myriad of smaller insurgencies across Uganda (Espeland and Petersen 2010; Finnström 2008). The Rwandan and Ugandan governments’ interventions in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo in the 1990s similarly required considerable attention (Reyntjens 2009; Vlassenroot, Perrot, and Cuvelier 2012). In addition, the Ugandan government was preoccupied with the country’s significant economic problems (Reinikka and Collier 2001; Kuteesa et al. 2010) and the HIV/AIDS crisis (Kinsman 2010). The government, the standard narrative suggests, had to consider its priorities:

The question was: which war do you fight? Karamoja wasn’t a war. It wasn’t necessary for the government to fight there, to disarm the Karamojong. Previous disarmament initiatives failed because governments had more important issues. Karamoja guns weren’t such a big issue for the government, but once guns began to fall quiet elsewhere in Uganda, the government decided to make Karamoja part of Uganda. (UA4; also UO114; UO122)
The proponents of the standard narrative acknowledge, therefore, that the government had more pressing priorities than Karamoja, but argue that Museveni turned his attention to the region as soon as he was able to and, from the mid-2000s onwards, worked tirelessly to bring peace and prosperity to Karamojans. This assertion of the President’s beneficence is, however, contradicted by his government’s actions in Karamoja both during and after disarmament.

First, the extensiveness of human rights abuses and theft of livestock committed by the UPDF casts doubt on the pro-government explanation that attributes them to rogue soldiers and units and, instead, suggests that these phenomena were inherent to government plans (UO60).10 Second, as I document below, the policies that the NRM government has adopted following the completion of disarmament also demonstrate scant concern for Karamojans’ wellbeing. Service provision in Karamoja has followed a curiously bifurcated pattern. Services that directly benefit local people, such as education, healthcare, and support for pastoral livelihoods, are almost exclusively funded, and often provided, by Western donors, United Nations agencies, and non-governmental organizations. The government, on the other hand, has focused its attention on investment in road construction and electricity provision, as well as promotion of agricultural production and sedentarization; these undertakings either do not significantly affect the lives of ordinary Karamojans or, in cases where they disrupt or prevent the continuation of pastoral livelihoods, actively harm them. As I demonstrate below and in Part 2, they do, however, greatly benefit the Ugandan government and well-connected individuals, both state managers and their Karamojan associates, who have also engaged in widespread land-grabbing and legally questionable exploitation of mineral resources in the region.

This state of affairs indicates that the causal claims contained in the standard narrative are erroneous. Indeed, the Ugandan government’s objectives and the nature of the process of
extension of its power in Karamoja, which encompasses both disarmament and subsequent developments, appear to be significantly different from those postulated by the NRM government and its supporters. However, thorough investigation of the actual causes of the extension of state power in Karamoja is hindered by the closed nature of the authoritarian NRM regime and the strength of its control over Uganda’s shrinking political space.  

These characteristics of the regime account for the widespread acceptance of the standard narrative and, in many cases, a general lack of inquisitiveness regarding the objectives of the NRM government displayed by many of the otherwise well-informed individuals who participated in this project. For this reason, the explanations of the causes of extension of state power in Karamoja provided by the small number of research respondents who have critically considered and dissent from the standard narrative are particularly valuable (UO67; UO93; UO114; UO122). I reproduce a few especially insightful passages from my conversations with them below:

My perspective is that the NRM spent so much money on disarmament because... you pacify the area, then you get access to resources. Museveni worked under Obote as a researcher. He was exposed to information available about Karamoja, about minerals. His advisors have interest in the region because of gold, marble. They made this road so that they can access minerals. Now marble can reach Tororo Cement. If you go to Rupa, there is marble there. They cut it and move it to Uganda. The reason for disarmament was to exploit. The British knew that there was gold here. They knew Karamoja was rich. [...] I think that’s why M7 did that. (UO67)

From that time up to now... yes, you can see there’s been some development. Light has come, tarmac road has been constructed. But when you look at the time the NRM government has taken to deliver these services, do you think that there is priority given to this region? Why pick Karamoja at the eleventh hour, and you pick other regions at the first hour? You need to consider if this government has the interest of Karamoja at heart, or if it has different motives? Development taking place is not because the government gives any priority to the people of Karamoja. This development is done because of conditionalities this government is getting from some potential investors who want to invest in Karamoja. After discovery of minerals in Karamoja, the investors say they
need good roads, electricity. You find the big shots within the government are the ones who got exploration licenses in Karamoja, got mining leases in Karamoja. So, these are now the people who are now giving pressure to the government, who are making decisions to bring some development to Karamoja. This is so they can exploit the resources of Karamoja. It’s not that they want the people of Karamoja to benefit from this development. when you look at electricity, who is using electricity in Karamoja? It’s just the people in town. But you see power being taken very quickly to areas where they set up industries. Electricity has come with a different reasoning, not to serve the locals. (UO114)

They had known what is here, so it was just a matter of time for them to come here. The only stumbling block for them was the presence of the gun. When the gun left… now the voices are that we shouldn’t have given up the gun, we should’ve organized ourselves. If we’d known that our land would be taken over, that there would be so many investors… The government and all the actors knew the situation would be like this, that they would come fully. They knew those minerals. They knew how much they would get. (UO93)

The causal claims expressed by the respondents are remarkably uniform. In subsequent paragraphs, I unpack them and endeavour to assess their validity in relation to the historical development and contemporary nature of the NRM regime.

The regime is highly centralized and personalized. Essentially all political power in Uganda is vested in President Museveni, who has controlled the entire structure of the Ugandan state since he came to power in 1986. Neither competing political agents nor a popular revolt are likely to remove him from power, although Museveni prudently maintains a well-funded, equipped, and trained coercive apparatus in the form of the UPDF, Uganda Police, and various paramilitary organizations. Lower-ranking state managers, including members of his inner circle, know that, despite Museveni’s advanced age, they are unlikely to succeed him, as the President is grooming his son Muhoozi Kanyerugaba, or possibly his powerful wife (and former Minister for Karamoja Affairs) Janet Kataha Museveni, to serve as his heir (Hitchen 2017). Former acolytes who thought themselves capable of displacing Museveni, notably the President’s one-
time doctor Kizza Besigye and former prime minister Amama Mbabazi, not only failed in their quest for political dominance, but, by challenging Museveni, also excluded themselves from the state-managing elite and lost their previous influence (Abrahamsen and Bareebe 2016). On the other hand, loyal lieutenants, many of whom have served Museveni continuously since the civil war (including Prime Minister Ruhakana Rugunda, First Deputy Prime Minister Moses Ali, and Minister of Justice Kahinda Otafiire), are unlikely to be removed from the state-managing elite. Since their quest for power is either fully realized (for Museveni) or necessarily restricted (for other state managers), pursuit of wealth, as the only means through which they can further improve their standing, emerges as the primary objective of Ugandan state managers. Furthermore, given the regime’s strong hold on power, there are effectively no political restrictions on personal enrichment. In fact, his underlings’ corruption serves Museveni as a convenient tool for ensuring their loyalty.

This discussion accounts for many aspects of the Ugandan state managers’ behaviour. First, the NRM regime has provided generous funding for the coercive apparatus (Kuteesa et al. 2006). Second, it has exhibited a great deal of tolerance towards high levels of corruption (Muriisa 2005; Tangri and Mwenda 2003 and 2006). Third, the government’s dedicated pursuit of foreign aid (in 2006, official development assistance accounted for 42% of the government budget; Africa Research Institute 2016; also Atingi-Ego 2005; Mwenda 2006) to fund services not only benefits the population, but also serves state managers both indirectly by removing restrictions on the proportion of the national budget that can be reallocated to fund the coercive apparatus and embezzled by state managers and directly as a source of wealth that can be misappropriated (including, notably, through theft of donor funds allocated for the Peace, Recovery and Development Programme, or PRDP, in Karamoja and northern Uganda; Daily
Monitor 2012b; Irish Times 2012; New Vision 2012; Observer 2012a and 2012b; Relief Web 2009). Fourth, the interventions in the DRC have, likewise, provided a valuable source of wealth (Reyntjens 2010; Vlassenroot, Perrot, and Cuvelier 2012). Finally, and fifth, as I demonstrate below, more recently the exploitation of Karamoja’s natural resources and land-grabbing contributed to state managers’ personal enrichment.

The preceding discussion elucidates the main objective (the acquisition of wealth) of Ugandan state managers responsible for the decision to initiate the process of extension of state power into Karamoja. However, this objective alone does not fully account for the timing of the disarmament process. Although consolidation of power by the NRM regime, which enabled a shift from emphasis on maintaining power to pursuit of wealth, was a gradual process, significant levels of corruption among high-level Ugandan officials could be observed as early as the mid-1990s, long before the most recent disarmament campaign in Karamoja was launched (Czuba 2010; Tangri and Mwenda 2003 and 2006). State managers’ turn to pursuit of wealth did not, therefore, immediately lead to the initiation of the process of extension of state power in Karamoja. Instead, the delayed timing of disarmament is explained by two factors.

First, state managers could initially help themselves to assets that they had inherited from their predecessors, such as the state-owned Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB), which was taken over by Museveni’s brother Caleb Akandwanaho, commonly known as Salim Saleh (his nom de guerre), and subsequently sold to South Africa’s Stanbic Bank (Czuba 2010). Similarly, the interventions in the DRC provided both rents benefitting Ugandan state managers and their associates and significant contributions to Uganda’s budget (Reyntjens 2010, 229; Vlassenroot, Perrot, and Cuvelier 2012). By the mid-2000s, however, many existing government assets had
already been pilfered, while changes in the international environment made subsequent external interventions, in the DRC or elsewhere, untenable.

Second, the pro-NRM standard narrative correctly identifies the significant threats that Museveni’s government faced in the first twenty years of its existence. The brutal war against the LRA in the North, especially, made it difficult to expend resources on another military operation which, since Karamojans did not pose a threat to the NRM regime, was not strictly necessary. In addition, the many conflicts in which the Ugandan government was involved provided an important rationale for the maintenance of the extensive coercive apparatus. Considerable expenditures were necessary to equip and train the large numbers of UPDF personnel, who were continuously kept in fighting shape by their participation in military engagements, in the process acquiring valuable experience. This apparatus ensured the government’s ability to contain any potential threats and pacify the population should it become dissatisfied with the status quo. The Ugandan withdrawal from the DRC and gradual winding-down of the war with the LRA, which from 2006 onwards required significantly fewer resources than before, presented the government with a new challenge. Although many UPDF personnel were temporarily not needed, the government had no desire to lose the protection from potential threats that they offered or risk alienating the military. The UPDF was a large, powerful organization; it was neither in the interest of its influential commanders nor of its regular soldiers to lose access to the resources that it provided. Furthermore, potentially discharging the well-trained and experienced military personnel into civilian life—which, given the very high poverty and unemployment, might lead to their discontent—was a risky choice. Launch of the disarmament campaign in 2006 allowed state managers to sidestep this problem and kill two birds with one stone: enrich themselves through exploitation of Karamoja’s natural resources and keep the UPDF busy. In addition, the
government used disarmament to publicize Karamojans’ poverty and, thereby, gain access to foreign aid intended to alleviate it.\textsuperscript{14}

If the state managers’ primary objective in Karamoja was to enrich themselves through exploitation of the region’s natural resources, they must have anticipated potential backlash from Karamojans, who consider themselves to be the legitimate owners of the land. In this light, the UPDF’s actions during disarmament can be seen as intended to keep the region’s inhabitants docile, afraid of challenging the government, and unable to oppose its future actions. These conditions help the government to maintain its control of Karamoja and, thereby, unimpeded access to the region’s considerable natural resources, although simmering tensions make continuing UPDF presence necessary. A Karamojong civil society activist relates the following incident:

We had a meeting the other day with the army. We said: “Karamoja is now peaceful. Can you go?” And they say: “No, we can’t do it. There will be conflict again.” They are protecting the very many things they own here. They are protecting the investments they brought here. The reason is not insecurity, but to protect what they came here for in the first place. (UO93)

Post-disarmament developments in Karamoja support this interpretation. President Museveni signalled the region’s importance to Ugandan state managers by appointing his wife Janet Kataha Museveni to the position of Minister for Karamoja Affairs in 2009 (initially as a Minister of State for Karamoja and, after 2011, cabinet-level Minister for Karamoja Affairs; she left that post in 2016 to become the Minister of Education), ostensibly to alleviate Karamojans’ poverty. The Ugandan newspaper \textit{The Observer} has offered a pithy summary of her accomplishments:

A close look at key areas in Karamoja will tell you that it is only the occupants of her 15 or so vehicle motorcade, politicians, and the not-so-analytical that will say
Karamoja is different from then, and even so, as a direct result of her work. A visit at any time to Naro Apotiyaro village in the backyard of the plush State [L]odge in Morulinga, Napak [D]istrict, will shock you with signs of death from hunger and poverty. This is where the minister executes most of her Karamoja missions. And all said and done, it is likely that the minister’s tenure will mostly be remembered for her motorcades, the tight security that accompanied her presence, inaccessibility and the flights into the region to leapfrog over the muddy roads and bridgeless rivers. (Longoli 2012)

**Government policies in Karamoja after disarmament**

Analysis of the NRM government’ post-disarmament activities in Karamoja confirms *The Observer* contributor’s suspicion that poverty alleviation and provision of public services to the region’s inhabitants are of little importance to Ugandan state managers. Instead, the government has focused its attention on the construction of an administrative apparatus through which it can effectively control the region and implementation of policies that, on the one hand, enforce Karamojans’ compliance with its wishes and, on the other, facilitate exploitation of Karamoja’s natural resources.

To this end, the government has extended to Karamoja the Local Council (LC) system of administration that had existed elsewhere in Uganda since the 1980s. For the past decade, the LC1 (village) and LC3 (sub-county) chairpersons have served as the primary intermediaries between the state and the region’s population, especially in smaller, more isolated settlements.15 These elected officials are currently being slowly complemented by administrators—parish and sub-county chiefs—recruited to directly represent the interests of the Ugandan state in individual settlements. Although these agents of the government have thus far only been appointed in select areas of Karamoja, they are likely to significantly extend the Ugandan state managers’ ability to control the region (UO5; UO53; UO101; UO115; UO116; US1).
The control that the state exercises through this administrative apparatus is reinforced by the continuing presence of the UPDF, which uses collective punishment mechanisms to discipline serious infractions (such as gun ownership); gradual expansion of the police force; and destruction of pastoral livelihoods (Howe, Stites, and Akabwai 2015; UO93). The last component of this system of control serves to reduce the threats posed to the regime by pastoralists’ need for weapons and the existence of an independent material base. First, as long as Karamojans own livestock, they need guns to protect themselves from raids and restock following the frequent shocks inherent to the region’s non-equilibrium ecosystem (see e.g. Ellis and Swift 1988; McCabe 2004); such weapons can easily be turned against the government. Second, economic autonomy from the Ugandan state made possible by successful continuation of Karamojans’ pastoral livelihoods might, similarly, help them to challenge efforts to deprive them of their land and its riches. The erosion of pastoral livelihoods in Kamoja is accomplished primarily through promotion of agricultural production and sedentarization, which have received a significant proportion of government spending in the region.16

Most of the other funds committed to Karamoja (with the exception of the budgets of the administrative and coercive apparatus necessary to control the region) have been allocated for infrastructure development. According to a Karamojan member of parliament:

The motive is that some of those big people in the government have interest in the region. They know that if they don’t invest in good infrastructure they can’t tap into this wealth. This is the key reason the government is investing” (UO124; also UO58).

The two most prominent infrastructure projects have involved construction of roads and extension of Uganda’s power grid to the region. The tarmac road that will eventually connect Moroto to the Ugandan road network is currently under construction. Its first section, from
Moroto to Nakapiripirit, was completed (at the cost of UGX 184 billion, or USD 51 million) in 2016 (Nabwiiso 2013; UNRA 2016). Other transport corridors, including the roads from Kaabong through Kotido to Moroto and from Kosiroi through Amudat to Nakapiripirit, have also been upgraded. Amudat, Kangole, Moroto, Matany, Nakapiripirit, and a few smaller trading centres, as well as some government institutions and mining operations were connected to the electric grid between 2012 and 2013 (New Vision 2013; Rural Electrification Agency n.d.).

These costly investments have made a minimal contribution to the wellbeing of Karamojans, few of whom can afford to travel, whether on (very limited) public transport or in private vehicles. With the exception of food assistance, little food consumed in rural areas originates outside Karamoja. However, the road construction projects have greatly improved access to major natural resource extraction areas, especially those in the previously difficult to access Kaabong District and on Mount Moroto.17 Similarly, fewer than 2,000 households are connected to the power line that runs from Moroto to Soroti. Electricity supply is, however, important for gold and limestone mining operations and for the comfort of their workers, as well as businesspeople, government administrators, and Karamojan local leaders (UA4). Therefore, whereas subversion of pastoral livelihoods through promotion of agriculture and sedentarization simply helps Ugandan state managers to keep Karamoja and its inhabitants under control, infrastructure investment directly allows them to tap into the region’s natural resources.

Ugandan rulers’ interest in service provision in Karamoja is mostly limited to these two objectives (that is, subversion of pastoral livelihoods and expansion of infrastructure for resource extraction). The state managers have, however, successfully taken advantage of other organizations’ willingness to contribute to alleviating Karamojans’ poverty and ill-being. As a result, while the government has paid for the aforementioned infrastructure projects itself and
covered at least some (but not all) of the cost of the promotion of crop cultivation, almost all other services provided to Karamojans are funded and, in many cases, administered by bilateral donors, United Nations agencies, and non-governmental organizations.\textsuperscript{18}

The most important modality of service provision in Karamoja, food assistance, which the World Food Programme (WFP) has supplied to the region’s inhabitants continuously since the 1970s, is administered by non-governmental organizations contracted to do so by the WFP. Despite the decade of stability and security that has followed disarmament and hundreds of millions of dollars spent by donors on development and humanitarian interventions, undernutrition patterns have remained unchanged.\textsuperscript{19} Relatedly, Karamoja remains one of the poorest parts of the world: 75 percent of its inhabitants live below the poverty line (50 percent more than in other Ugandan regions). The literacy rate stands at 12 percent and, since only 51 percent of children are enrolled in (very poor-quality) primary schools—compared to 81 percent elsewhere in Uganda— is likely to remain exceedingly low for a long time (WFP 2015). While ordinary Karamojans suffer, however, Ugandan state-managers and their local subordinates, quite literally, make a killing.

**Natural resource exploitation and large-scale land acquisition in Karamoja**

Karamoja’s continuing poverty does not in any way impede the realization of Ugandan state managers’ objectives. As long as the region remains stable, it offers them outstanding opportunities for personal enrichment. Although exploration remains in early stages, deposits of gold, silver, copper, iron, titanium, manganese, niobium, tantalite, chrome, rare earth and radioactive minerals, precious and semi-precious stones (ruby, sapphire, red and green garnet, labradorite, fluorite, quartz), and limestone and marble have been identified in Karamoja. Moroto District alone contains at least thirty-seven million tonnes of limestone and marble; the quantities
of the other minerals are unknown, but likely significant (see Map 1, below; Hinton et al. n.d.). Furthermore, the Ugandan government believes that the Kadam-Moroto sedimentary basin in Moroto and Nakapiripirit districts may contain large commercially-viable deposits of petroleum, but no discoveries have been made to date (*New Vision* 2014; Odyek 2015; UO124). In addition to mineral resources, Karamoja is potentially an excellent setting for the creation of private livestock ranches and, in the Western “green belt,” agricultural production on land that, due to many Karamojans’ semi-nomadic mobility patterns and historical reliance on pastoralism, the government considers to be “empty” (UA4).

To harness these opportunities, Ugandan state managers and their associates have acquired exploration and mining licenses that cover most of the region’s territory (Map 2, below), as well as titles to particularly valuable tracts of land (UA5). Exploitation of the natural resources that they contain is highly profitable, although the wealth that it generates is impossible to estimate given the secretive nature of the phenomenon, which is carried out by privately-held companies.

Map 1. Mineral resources in Karamoja (Source: Hinton et al. n.d.)
Investors involved in exploitation of natural resources (in Karamoja and elsewhere in Uganda) are greatly assisted by the laws enacted by the state managers. In addition, to further facilitate land-grabbing and mineral exploration, 53.8% of Karamoja’s land area, previously protected as wildlife conservation areas, was de-gazetted in 2002, in the course of the first (and
ultimately unsuccessful) disarmament drive undertaken by the NRM regime in the twenty-first century (Trocaire 2010). The final disarmament drive of 2006 followed soon after. As a result, the number of mining operations and large-scale land acquisitions in the region has increased rapidly in recent years. In 1996, only thirteen companies held mining or exploration licenses in Karamoja. By 2010, thirty-eight licenses covering 6,897 square kilometres (a quarter of Karamoja’s territory) had been granted (Ibid.). In 2014, over 100 mining companies were reported to operate and in 2015—140 (Ariong 2015b; Lumu 2014). A visual inspection of Map 2 indicates that licenses cover more than half of the region’s territory. Estimation of the area of land acquired in an illegal—or, at least, legally questionable—manner is far more difficult. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that the phenomenon has grown incrementally since 2002 (UO58; UO127; UO128).

Nearly all major investors involved in mining or large-scale land acquisitions in Karamoja belong to the state-managing elite: they are members of the Museveni family, cabinet ministers, senior military officers, other senior government officials, and businesspeople connected to the political leaders. I document a number of such cases, none of which have been previously reported in the scholarly literature, in Appendix 2.

Conclusion

Investigation of the causes of the 2006 disarmament campaign, which set the stage for subsequent extension of the power of the Ugandan state in Karamoja, reveals that the primary objective of the Ugandan state managers has been pursuit of personal enrichment through exploitation of the region’s considerable natural resources. The investigation demonstrates the falsity of the government’s claim that disarmament was intended to bring peace and development to the region. A decade after the campaign began, Karamoja remains one of the world’s poorest
places, and its inhabitants’ livelihoods continue to be eroded by counterproductive government policies. Although the campaign did bring stability to Karamoja, it only did so at the cost of widespread human rights abuses. Karamojans’ disaffection is kept in check by development and humanitarian assistance provided by non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies, the memory of the brutality of conflict and disarmament, the UPDF’s collective punishment mechanisms, and deceptive explanations of the region’s plight propagated by both the government and the new Karamojan elite that has come into being in the recent past. This new category of local leaders represents the interests of the NRM regime in Karamoja and, in return, is rewarded with government positions and wealth, which they acquire in part by emulating the example of their principals. I explore the role that the emergent Karamojan political elite has played in the process of extension of state power in Karamoja in Part 2 of the working paper.

**Appendix 1.** Human rights violations committed in Karamoja by the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF).

Unless specifically stated otherwise, the reported incidents are attributed by sources to the UPDF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of incidents</th>
<th>Number of victims</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Kacheri and Panyangara, Kotido District, and multiple unspecified locations in Kaabong District</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown, multiple</td>
<td>Stites and Huisman 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late 1999</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Several hundred</td>
<td>Gray et al. 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2011</td>
<td>Across Karamoja</td>
<td>death</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>Kolyangha 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown, possibly 2002</td>
<td>Lotim, Kaabong District</td>
<td>beatings</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown, multiple</td>
<td>Knighton 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th March 2002</td>
<td>Nakapelimoru, Kotido District</td>
<td>Death, rape, beatings</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Multiple, at least 17 (2 deaths, including 1 child, 12 rapes, beatings of multiple children)</td>
<td>Knighton 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Source(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st March 2002</td>
<td>Kotido-Moroto road, Kotido District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>3 (including Fr. Declan O’Toole, shortly after he reported the 9th March 2002 incident in Nakapelimoru to the Irish embassy) HRW 2007; Knighton 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>Moroto District</td>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>1 (mother of David Pulkol MP, beaten and forced to swallow her beads) Knighton 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Across Karamoja</td>
<td>Death caused by violent incidents</td>
<td>Unknown 202 CEWARN 2007²⁶</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Across Karamoja</td>
<td>Death caused by violent incidents</td>
<td>Unknown 545 CEWARN 2007²⁷</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Across Karamoja</td>
<td>Death caused by violent incidents</td>
<td>Unknown 147 CEWARN 2007²⁸</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown, possibly 2006</td>
<td>Natapararengan and Lomormor, Nakapiripirit District</td>
<td>Dismemberment and torture</td>
<td>Unknown More than 10 Bevan 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-May 2006</td>
<td>Kotido District</td>
<td>Death, injury</td>
<td>Unknown 11 (and 5 injuries) Mkutu 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Kotido District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Unknown, multiple Bevan 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Losogat, Kotido District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>2 No author 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th May 2006</td>
<td>Lomejan, Kotido District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>1 No author 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th May 2006</td>
<td>Locholi, Napak District (then Moroto District)</td>
<td>Injury, torture</td>
<td>1 Unknown, multiple (including 1 death) No author 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th May 2006</td>
<td>Morualoyette, Napak District (then Moroto District)</td>
<td>Death, injury</td>
<td>2 (including 1 death and 3 injuries) No author 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th and 26th May 2006</td>
<td>Jimos, Kotido District; Loperot, Loputiput, and Longoleki, Moroto District</td>
<td>Death, sexual violence, extrajudicial detention</td>
<td>4 Unknown, multiple (including 5 deaths and 4 rapes) HRW 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st May 2006</td>
<td>Kakomongole, Nakapiripirit District</td>
<td>Death, injury</td>
<td>1 Unknown, multiple (including 2 deaths) No author 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th May 2006</td>
<td>Modokonyang, Kotido District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>1 No author 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th May 2006</td>
<td>Nawaikorot, Napak District (then Moroto District)</td>
<td>Beatings</td>
<td>1 Unknown, multiple No author 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date/Location</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>Sources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd June 2006</td>
<td>Watakau, Kotido District</td>
<td>Death, torture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown, multiple (including 3 deaths)</td>
<td>No author 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2006</td>
<td>cattle market near the Kotido-Kaabong district border</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bevan 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th June 2006</td>
<td>Nadunget, Moroto District</td>
<td>Death, injury</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (including 1 death and 2 injuries)</td>
<td>No author 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2006</td>
<td>Longalom, Moroto District</td>
<td>Beatings</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Approximately 30</td>
<td>HRW 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th October 2006</td>
<td>Lopuyo (Lopei according to Mkutu 2008), Kotido District</td>
<td>Death, sexual violence and displacemnt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48-75 deaths (including at least 1 UPDF soldier), 1 rape, displacement of at least 1133 people following destruction of their homes by UPDF</td>
<td>HRW 2007; Mkutu 2008; OHCHR 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th November 2006</td>
<td>Kadokini, Kotido District</td>
<td>Death, injuries, torture, extrajudicial detention</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50 households (including 3 deaths, 2 injuries, 7 acts of torture, 68 arrests)</td>
<td>OHCHR 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th November 2006</td>
<td>Kanawat, Kotido District</td>
<td>Death and injury</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8 (4 deaths, including 1 child, and 4 injuries, including 1 child)</td>
<td>OHCHR 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th December 2006</td>
<td>Kalodeke, Kaabong District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>HRW 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th December 2006</td>
<td>Nakot, Kaabong District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>HRW 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>across Karamoja</td>
<td>Beatings</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Unknown, multiple</td>
<td>HRW 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>across Karamoja</td>
<td>Extrajudicial detention; torture and deprivation of food, water and shelter while in custody</td>
<td>Unknown, multiple</td>
<td>Unknown, multiple (between 50 and 100 at the Nadunget detention facility only)</td>
<td>HRW 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st January 2007</td>
<td>Irosa, Kaabong District</td>
<td>Death and injury</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (including 1 death and 1 non-lethal gunshot wound)</td>
<td>HRW 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th January 2007</td>
<td>Nadunget, Moroto District</td>
<td>beating</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>HRW 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Incident</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th February 2007</td>
<td>Kotido District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>BBC 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th March 2007</td>
<td>Kacheri, Kotido District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2007</td>
<td>Naaut, Tapac, Moroto District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prior to the 24th April 2007</td>
<td>Tapac, Moroto District</td>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th-11th May 2007</td>
<td>Najokogolit, Katikekile, Moroto District</td>
<td>Death and torture</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20 (4 deaths and 16 acts of torture)</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th May 2007</td>
<td>Nakwanga, Moroto District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>around 20th May 2007</td>
<td>Losilang, Kotido District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prior to the 19th May 2007</td>
<td>Lokopo, Moroto District (now Napak District)</td>
<td>Torture and sexual violence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prior to the 22nd May 2007</td>
<td>Katikekile, Moroto District</td>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown, multiple</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd May 2007</td>
<td>Lojom, Tapac, Moroto District</td>
<td>Beating</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th May 2007</td>
<td>Kodike, Iriiri, Moroto District (now Napak District)</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-June 2007</td>
<td>Nateedekitoe, Losilang, Kotido District</td>
<td>Beating and torture</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown, multiple</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th May-3rd June 2007</td>
<td>Lorengedwat, Nakapiripirit District</td>
<td>Beating and sexual violence</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Unknown, multiple</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prior to the 11th June 2007</td>
<td>Nayese, Losilang, Kotido District</td>
<td>Injury, torture and beating</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th June 2007</td>
<td>Kacheri, Kotido District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th July 2007</td>
<td>Loputuk, Moroto District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (including 1 child)</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th July 2007</td>
<td>Lokopuk, Moroto District</td>
<td>Beating</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown, multiple (including children)</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st July 2007</td>
<td>Lotinit and Lorukum, Nakapiripirit District</td>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Unknown, multiple</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-August 2007</td>
<td>Lokopo, Moroto District (now Napak District)</td>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>OHCHR 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-June 2009</td>
<td>Kotido and Moroto districts</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Wanyama 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd January 2010</td>
<td>Kacheri, Kotido District</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1-20 (including 1 child)</td>
<td>Butagira 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 30th-31st March 2010

Location: Kosiroi, Moroto District  
Date: 30th-31st March 2010  
Event: Death  
Number: 1  
Notable: 12 (allegedly involving Lt. Col. Muhoozi Kainerugaba)  
Sources: Kulayigye 2010; Mugerwa 2010; Nsubuga 2010

### 24th April 2010

Location: Likitangelam, Rengen, Kotido District  
Date: 24th April 2010  
Event: Death  
Number: 1  
Notable: 10-43 (including 5 or 6 children)  
Sources: Butagira 2010; Edwards 2010

### 22nd June 2010

Location: Moroto District  
Date: 22nd June 2010  
Event: Death  
Number: 1  
Notable: 2-8  
Sources: Arijong 2010

### 18th August 2010

Location: Rengen, Kotido District  
Date: 18th August 2010  
Event: Death  
Number: 1  
Notable: 10  
Sources: Kulayigye 2010

### 2012

Location: Across Karamoja  
Date: 2012  
Event: Violations of the rights to life, to freedom from torture, and to personal liberty  
Number: 148 (including 20 cases of violations of the right to life)  
Notable: Unknown, multiple  
Sources: OHCHR 2013

### 2013

Location: Across Karamoja  
Date: 2013  
Event: Violations of the rights to life, to freedom from torture, and to personal liberty  
Number: 101 (including 22 cases of violations of the right to life)  
Notable: Unknown, multiple  
Sources: OHCHR 2013

### Appendix 2. Mining operations and land acquisitions in Karamoja involving Ugandan state managers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Investor</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Strength of evidence</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lopedo, Kaabong District</td>
<td>1990s-present</td>
<td>Salim Saleh and others</td>
<td>Gold mining</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>The Museveni family’s involvement in exploitation of Karamoja’s mineral deposits goes back to the 1990s, when the President’s brother, General Salim Saleh formed a partnership, in which he appears to have held a 40%-stake, with Branch Energy of South Africa to develop a gold mine at Lopedo in (what is now) Kaabong District. The company claimed to have invested USD 40 million at Lopedo and constructed an airstrip that was used to transport the extracted gold directly to Nairobi’s Wilson Airport. Citing low profits, in 2001 Branch Energy sold the mine to Catalyst Corporation, which was apparently co-owned by Salim Saleh, and Oslo International; the mine appears to have remained mothballed in subsequent years (Ababaka 2009; Africa Analysis 2001;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2011, however, an outfit called East African Gold (EAM) PLC was incorporated in Jersey to reestablish gold extraction at Lopedo; the mine was operational as of 2014 (HRW 2014). There is no evidence linking Salim Saleh to EAM, but it seems likely that he retained his stake in the operation, which continues to be known in Karamoja as “the first family’s mine” (UO94).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moroto District</td>
<td>c. 2014-present</td>
<td>Muhoozi Kainerugaba</td>
<td>Gold mining</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moruita, Nakapiripirit District</td>
<td>2012-present</td>
<td>Jovia Saleh</td>
<td>Illegal acquisition of land</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

President Yoweri Museveni’s eldest son (and presumed heir) Muhoozi Kainerugaba, at that time a lieutenant colonel in charge of the 13th Battalion of the Special Forces, is known to have operated in Tapach in 2010—according to allegations voiced by the Pokot politician Kiyonga Francis Adamson, Muhoozi and his subordinates were responsible for the killings of several civilians in the area (Kulayigye 2010; Nsubuga 2010)—and is claimed to have identified the area’s mining potential during that time. A few years later (perhaps around 2014) he apparently established a gold mine on Moroto Mountain that operates disguised as UPDF barracks. Because military personnel have blocked access to the area, this claim cannot be verified; it has, however, been voiced by two reliable and well-informed research respondents (UO94; UO126).

In 2012, two companies, Feronia Uganda Limited and Pro-Solutions Limited, which are widely believed to be controlled by Salim Saleh’s wife Jovia Akandwanaho, acquired land titles (for a 99-year lease) to 6,130 hectares of land at Kamacharin and 2,001 hectares at Kakomongole in Nakapiripirit District, for which they paid UGX 440 million (approximately USD 180,000 at the time of the transaction) and UGX 140 million (approximately USD 55,000), respectively (Daily Monitor 2012a; Talep 2012; UO2; UO5; UO55; UO56; UO123; UO126). The sale was conducted by the then Nakapiripirit District LC5 Chairman Lorot John, Chief Administrative Officer Kisembo Moses, Deputy Resident District Commissioner Oryem Bernard, and District Physical Planner Aji Nkobe without following due process specified in Ugandan law, which grants limited (but nonexistent) protections to customary land owners. Neither the area land committees nor the District Land Board were consulted; the District Physical Planner forged the
District Land Board chairman’s signature (Ariong 2012; UO56; UO123; UO128). The district government has apparently never received the money, which is claimed to have been paid directly to Lorot and other officials (UO56; UO123). The purpose of land acquisition is unclear: it has been attributed to plans to initiate agricultural production on the land (which seems unlikely without the construction of an extensive irrigation system), establish a cattle ranch, or mine for gold (although no exploration license has been issued). After the transaction, Feronia and Pro-Solutions engaged in talks to sub-lease the land to a Canadian ranching company for USD 8 million; the Akandwanahos’ son was seen in the area with the company’s representative and spoke to district officials (UO5; UO56; UO123).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Suspect</th>
<th>Nature of Land Acquisition</th>
<th>Extent of Land Acquisition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karenga, Kaabong District</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unidentified members of the Museveni family</td>
<td>Irregular acquisition of land</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified members of the Museveni family have supposedly acquired a tract of land in Karenga in Kaabong District, close to the borders of Kidepo National Park, with the intention of transforming it into farmland (UO94). I have not been able to obtain any more information about this apparent instance of land-grabbing.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boma Grounds, Moroto, Moroto District</td>
<td>c. 2013</td>
<td>Janet Kataha Museveni</td>
<td>Irregular acquisition of land</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As the Minister for Karamoja Affairs, Janet Kataha Museveni has occasionally been linked to misappropriation of public funds (e.g. <em>New Vision</em> 2012). There is, however, no evidence of her direct involvement in mineral exploitation or land-grabbing in the region. The rumour, originally spread in 2013, that she had acquired the land title for Boma Grounds, Moroto’s most important public space, does not appear to be credible (UO126). More seriously, she has been accused of using her subordinates—government officials such as Amodoi Peter and Limlim Robert, whose activities I document in Part 2—as conduits to acquire land for herself (UO67).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple locations on Mount Moroto, Moroto District</td>
<td>1990s (?)-present</td>
<td>Tororo Cement (Sam Kutesa)</td>
<td>Limestone and marble mining</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tororo Cement—co-owned by Sam Kutesa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (as well as Muhoozi Kainerugaba’s father-in-law)—has continuously operated in Karamoja longer than any other mining company. Originally licensed (perhaps in the 1990s) to mine limestone and marble on 12 km² of land on Mount Moroto, it has since irregularly (and likely illegally) expanded its operations to cover 49 km² (UO5; UO119). Mount Moroto appears to be the source of the majority of the Tororo...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cement’s supply of limestone, which it needs to manufacture its eponymous product. The company is the largest cement producer in Uganda and the sixth largest taxpayer in the country (Uganda Business News 2016). The profits from its Karamojan operations are, however, impossible to determine. As a local leader in Amudat, through which limestone and marble is transported from Kosiroi to the company’s factory in Tororo, has observed, “[t]here is no independent way of quantifying what Tororo Cement is taking. Because Sam Kutesa has a 30 percent share of Tororo. His daughter is married to the son of the president. Tororo Cement is undervaluing how much cement they ferry, evading taxes to the central government, not paying the local government at all. All that is because Kutesa is in government” (UO5). It is worth noting that, until 2016, when Tororo Cemented invested in its own trucks, all the vehicles used to transport the minerals extracted from Mount Moroto to Tororo were apparently owned by Salim Saleh (UO126).

Rupa, Moroto District 2012-2014 or 2015 Jan Mangal (Engola Sam and Cornelius Lorika Kodet) Gold mining High Jan Mangal operated a gold mine at Nakiloru and Nakibat in Rupa Sub-county in Moroto District from 2012 to 2015 or 2016, when it closed the operation because of yields insufficient for large-scale investment. The company was co-owned by the State Minister for Housing (and Salim and Jovia Saleh’s former partner in the theft of the DRC’s minerals in the 1990s, as well as a suspected drug trafficker) Engola Sam (apparently the majority shareholder), influential Karimojong Pian businessman Cornelius Lorika Kodet, and a Gujarati businessman (HRW 2014; Saferworld 2014; Vlassenroot, Perrot, and Cuvelier 2012; New Vision 2002; UA5; UO126; UO128).

Appendix 3. List of research respondents cited in the working paper.

Given the politically sensitive nature of the research project, no identifying information was collected.
KE401, influential Pokot elder, interviewed in Kacheliba, West Pokot, on the 1st October 2016
UA1, international organization official, interviewed in Moroto on the 10th November 2016
UA2, Western NGO worker, interviewed in Moroto on the 1st November 2016
UA4, Ugandan academic, interviewed in Kampala on the 9th December 2016
UA5, Ugandan human rights lawyer, interviewed in Kampala on the 12th December 2016
UA4, Ugandan human rights lawyer, interviewed in Kampala on the 12th December 2016
UO1, member of parliament from Karamoja, interviewed in Kampala on the 12th October 2016
UO2, former member of parliament from Karamoja, interviewed in Kampala on the 13th October 2016
UO4, former member of parliament from Karamoja, interviewed in Kampala on the 14th October 2016
UO5, Pokot senior LC5 official, Amudat District, interviewed in Amudat on the 17th October 2016
UO53, Pokot NRM official, Amudat District, interviewed in Amudat on the 26th October 2016
UO55, Karamojong senior LC5 official, Nakapiripirit District, interviewed in Nakapiripirit on the 27th October 2016
UO56, Karamojong senior LC5 official, Nakapiripirit District, interviewed in Nakapiripirit on the 27th October 2016
UO60, Karamojong senior LC5 official, Nakapiripirit District, interviewed in Nakapiripirit on the 28th October 2016
UO67, Karamojong senior civil servant, Napak District, interviewed in Moroto on the 2nd November 2016
UO93, Karamojong civil society activist, interviewed in Moroto on the 7th November 2016
UO101, senior official, Moroto Municipality, interviewed in Moroto on the 8th November 2016
UO113, Kuliak politician, interviewed in Moroto on the 9th November 2016
UO114, Karamojong civil society activist, interviewed in Moroto on the 9th November 2016
UO115, parish chief, Moroto District, interviewed in Rupa on the 10th November 2016
UO116, parish chief, Moroto District, interviewed in Rupa on the 10th November 2016
UO119, Kuliak politician, interviewed in Moroto on the 11th November 2016
UO122, member of parliament from Karamoja, interviewed in Kampala on the 9th December 2016
UO123, Karamojong lawyer, interviewed in Kampala on the 10th December 2016
UO124, member of parliament from Karamoja, interviewed in Kampala on the 12th December 2016
UO126, Karamojong NGO worker, interviewed in Kampala on the 14th December 2016
UO127, Karamojong donor agency worker, interviewed in Kampala on the 15th December 2016
UO128, Karamojong NGO worker, interviewed via Skype on the 11th January 2016
US1, senior official, Ministry of Public Service, interviewed in Kampala on the 16th November 2016

Endnotes

1 I would like to express my gratitude to Dave Eaton, Antoinette Handley, Elizabeth Stites, and, especially, Judith Teichman for their very helpful comments on various drafts of this working paper, as well as to Lomongin Benedicto and Okia Emmanuel for their assistance with some of the interviews on which the paper is based.
2 I define state managers as political agents who control the Ugandan state. This category includes elected government officials, foremost among whom is President Yoweri Museveni; other members of the Museveni family; influential National Resistance Movement apparatchiks; bureaucrats; military commanders; and other powerful political agents.
3 Karamoja forms the westernmost section of the dryland region which stretches eastwards across northern Kenya and eastern and southern Ethiopia to the Somali border. The process of extension of state power that Karamoja has experienced since the initiation of the 2006 disarmament campaign is mirrored by parallel developments taking
place in the Ethiopian and Kenyan sections of the drylands. For many decades the governments of the three countries had only very limited interest in the drylands and made little effort to extend their reach into the region. At the turn of the twenty-first century, however, all three governments initiated a rapid extension of state presence and power across the drylands. This process has 1) dramatically transformed the nature of the relationships between the three countries, the state managers who control them, and the primarily pastoralist inhabitants of the region, 2) reshaped the economic, political, and social organization of the drylands (including the complex non-state customary governance systems established by the societies that inhabit the region), and 3) affected the political regimes in place in the three countries. This working paper is part of a larger project that investigates the process of extension of state power across the drylands of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.

4 The Karimojong live in southern Karamoja and are commonly subdivided into the Bokora (mostly in what is now Napak District), Matheniko (in Moroto District), and Pian (in Nakapiripirit District) sections (although other, smaller identities can also be identified; Knighton 2010, 141-142). The Karimojong lands are bordered to the north by Kotido District, inhabited by the Jie. The final Ugandan group of the Ateker Cluster are the Dodoth, who live in Kaabong District in the north of Karamoja (Gulliver 1952; Knighton 2010).

The Karamojong share Karamoja with a number of other groups. The Ugandan Pokot live primarily in Amudat District, but also form a substantial minority in the Karimojong Pian-dominated neighbouring Nakapiripirit District. The Ethur inhabit Abim District. Smaller Kuliak communities of the Ik (known to the Karamojong as Teuso), Nyangyia, and So (Tepeth in Dakaramojong) occupy the region’s mountain ranges (Bollig 2000; Ehret 2001; Gulliver 1952; Knighton 2005; Peristiany 1951a and 1951b).

The lack of reliable data makes estimation of Karamoja’s population uncertain. According to the 2014 census, 965,008 people live in Karamoja (107,966 in Abim District, 105,767 in Amudat District, 167,879 in Kaabong District, 181,050 in Kotido District, 103,432 in Moroto District, 156,690 in Nakapiripirit District, and 142,224 in Napak District), of whom 958,291 are members of ethnic groups indigenous to the region (129,102 Dodoth, 98,348 Ethur, 13,939 Ik, 165,242 Jie, 371,713 Karimojong, 2,655 Mening, and 23,422 So) (UBOS 2016). These figures are in line with the results of the 2002 census, which were disputed as too high by a number of scholars (Knighton 2010; Stites et al. 2007). Even if the official population numbers are exaggerated, they indicate a tremendous population increase. The data for mid-twentieth century (without doubt far more unreliable than contemporary official figures) suggest very small populations (20,200 Dodoth, 5,200 Ethur, 1,150 Ik, 18,200 Jie, 55,600 Karamojong, 730 So) (Gulliver 1952).

My examination of the political developments in Karamoja focuses on the Karamojong and the Pokot. Since they arguably have more in common with their Acholi and Langi kin than with their Karamojan neighbours, I exclude the Ethur agriculturalists from analysis entirely. Although distinct in terms of their culture, ethnic origin, language and livelihood practices, the marginal position that the Kuliak communities occupy in Karamoja and their relationship with the more numerous and powerful Karamojong provides some valuable insights into the political consequences of extension of state power in the region.

5 The Ethur are an agriculturalist community.

6 As the name suggests, these operations involved cordoning off settlements and searching for hidden weapons.

7 The list is undoubtedly incomplete. While most, and perhaps all large-scale incidents, such as the ones at Lopuyo in October 2006, which resulted in 48-75 deaths and displacement of over 1,000 people, Nagera-Kapus in February 2007 (34 deaths), and Lokitelang in April 2010 (10-43 deaths) have been recorded, many less deadly cases have likely failed to attract the attention of human rights agencies, journalists, and scholars, especially if they took place in locations remote or otherwise inaccessible from towns. Furthermore, most of the collected evidence concerns violations that occurred in 2006 and 2007, when the brutality of the UPDF cordon and search operations attracted considerable attention. Although the incidence of human rights violations in subsequent years presumably reduced as disarmament gradually drew to a close, the decline was probably not as pronounced as the data suggest. As the list in Appendix 1 demonstrates, human rights violations continued, but only newsworthy, larger-scale incidents were reported.

8 Recognizing prior failure of such policies both in Karamoja and elsewhere in the dryland region, foreign donors also objected to the promotion of sedentarization and agricultural production that the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government has identified as solutions to the erosion of pastoralist livelihoods to which it has contributed (Development Partners 2010; Wenzel 2011).

9 Analogous departments were created to attend to the new government’s interests in other geographic regions of Uganda.

10 Other aspects of the UPDF’s involvement in Karamoja further complicate the picture. There is evidence that UPDF soldiers sold arms to Karamojans (Bevan 2008: 48). In addition, according to a politician who closely observed disarmament activities, “the soldiers wanted disarmament not to finish, because they had operational
funds. They resisted our approach of fighting the bad elements and leaving guns with the good people. They turned it opposite: they allowed the raiders to hide, and started disarming the old people” (UO5). The UPDF’s focus on confiscation of guns (commonly used for protection), rather than pursuit of raiders, suggests that containment of raiding was not the primary concern of the government.

11 First, only a very small number of individuals in the top echelons of the state-managing elite, President Museveni, his family, and a few loyal acolytes, are privy to key decisions. In practice, I found it impossible to gain access to these individuals. Second, lower-ranking state managers, such as less powerful political leaders and civil servants, have little influence on those decisions and very limited knowledge of the decision-making process. Third, the NRM regime has over time become increasingly closed and distrustful of outsiders, including researchers. For this reason, most of the lower-ranking state managers, especially civil servants, to whom I have spoken are wary of disclosing information. Relatedly, access to official documents is often impossible. Fourth, because of the nature of the regime in power, members of Uganda’s once vibrant, but now rapidly declining civil society (academics, journalists, non-governmental organization workers) can rarely offer insights into the top state managers’ decisions.

12 The possibility that financial gain does not adequately explain the actions of Ugandan state managers was suggested to me by a Ugandan academic who argued that concern about potential security threats originating in Karamoja might have informed the NRM government’s commitment to effective disarmament in the region (UA4). In reality, however, Karamoja has never been a likely launching pad for the NRM’s adversaries; the primary threat of this kind that the Ugandan government has faced came from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which has operated further to the west. Karamojans themselves have certainly not posed a similar threat; if anything, internal conflict in the region helped Ugandan state managers to ensure that its valuable natural resources would not be exploited by their potential economic competitors while they were attending to more pressing challenges (UO93). Relatedly, since its inception the NRM regime has only engaged in conflict either to defend itself (the war with the LRA and other insurgencies) or to tap into new sources of rents (interventions in the DRC); territorial control does not appear to have been an important objective at any point. The explanatory power of the territorial control interpretation is, therefore, weak. In fact, since insecurity in Karamoja has not constituted a threat to Ugandan state managers, this discussion provides additional support to the previous conclusion that they are motivated by material gain.

Another potential explanation of the causes of disarmament in Karamoja suggests that it might have been intended to contribute to Uganda’s economic growth by unlocking the economic opportunities available in the region. However, while the mineral deposits that Karamoja contains are sizable, their exploitation is unlikely to have a significant impact on Ugandan economy. Because of the NRM regime’s strong hold on power, it is also not significantly affected by popular demands for economic development. In addition, to the extent that the NRM government has justified disarmament and its subsequent activities in Karamoja, it has done it in terms of their supposed (and, as I demonstrate below, imaginary) benefits for Karamojans (and not Ugandans more generally); its explanations of its involvement have never emphasized the region’s potential contribution to Uganda’s economy. There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that, beyond the opportunity it offers state managers to enrich themselves, the presence of natural resources in Karamoja has affected the decision to initiate the process of extension of state power in the region.

13 19% of Ugandans lived below the poverty line of USD 1.25 per day in 2012/2013; real unemployment rate in Uganda was estimated at 64% in 2016 (Africa Research Institute 2016).

14 The claims that UPDF soldiers involved in disarmament operations sold weapons to Karamojans and attempted to prolong insecurity in the region (Bevan 2008; UO5) suggest that they were also concerned about their future usefulness to the government. Such principal-agent problems appear, however, to have been restricted to isolated incidents. In any case, following the gradual winding down of disarmament in Karamoja, the government found another use for those soldiers who were no longer needed to police the region; they were shipped off to Somalia, where—thanks to European Union funding—they form a large proportion of the African Union peacekeeping force (Kamali 2016). Furthermore, although the human rights violations and thefts committed by the UPDF might conceivably be considered an element of such efforts to extend the duration of disarmament, their extensiveness suggests otherwise.

15 I detail the structure of the LC system in Karamoja in Part 2.

16 Since, because of low and highly variable rainfall, most of Karamoja cannot support reliable and sustainable agriculture, the region’s inhabitants (with the exception of the Ethur, whose territory in what is now Abim District is considerably more fertile) have historically primarily relied on livestock production to make optimal use of their land. The Karamojong (but not the Pokot in this part of their territory) complemented the pastoral component of their livelihood systems with opportunistic seasonal agricultural production. Exclusive reliance on agriculture has never, however, been possible in a region where crop failure can be expected, on average, once every three years.
The recurrent crop failure has not stopped the NRM government’s efforts, which go back to the Ten-Point Programme, to transform Karamojans into (easily controlled) settled agriculturalists. Between 2009 and 2014 alone, it spent USD 35 million to increase crop production and encourage sedentarization in Karamoja through its Karamoja Action Plan for Food Security (KAPFS). A significant proportion of the funds allocated for promotion of agricultural production has been embezzled, mismanaged, or wasted on schemes such as distribution of orange seeds (which are not suitable for cultivation in Karamoja) or purchase of unnecessary tractors (which were supplied by Welt Machinen Engineering, a company owned by Lokeri Peter MP and his sons Koriang Ben and Apo-Oroma Felix) (New Vision 2010; UO124). The limited success of such initiatives led the government to turn to coercive measures; in 2014 it made participation in agricultural production mandatory for Karamoja’s inhabitants (Bushby and Stites 2016; Nakalembe, Dempewolf, and Justice 2016; Kasasira 2013; IRIN News 2014a; UO124; US14).

These government policies have significantly affected land use patterns in the region. Since the start of the twenty-first century, the amount of land devoted to crop cultivation has increased either three- or tenfold (depending on source: Nakalembe, Dempewolf, and Justice 2016 or Egeru et al. 2014b, respectively). This dramatic cropland expansion has, however, had no impact on crop yields or food security in Karamoja, where food assistance continues to be essential. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that they have further undermined the basis of Karamojans’ pastoral livelihoods. As scholars who have studied this phenomenon observe: “Our findings bring into question whether continued promotion of rain-fed agriculture in Karamoja serves the best interests of the people. Current cropland expansion is directly competing and compromising pasture areas critical for livestock-based livelihoods” (Nakalembe, Dempewolf, and Justice 2016, 1). While it was previously believed that there were approximately two and a half million heads of cattle in the region, recent unpublished research conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations as part of a comprehensive livestock vaccination campaign indicates that as few as 1,494,860 actually remain (UA1). Given the rate of population growth in the region, if these findings are correct, the Karamojan pastoral livelihood system may be beyond recovery. Therefore, although the government initiatives developed to encourage agricultural production have failed to achieve their stated objectives, they have certainly furthered Ugandan state managers’ interests in the region.

During my field research in Amudat in October 2016, a large majority of vehicles passing through town, which lies along the road from the Tororo Cement mines on Mount Moroto to Nakapiripirit, were trucks carrying limestone to the cement factory in Tororo. So many of these trucks use the road that China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, which is extending the Moroto-Nakapiripirit road to Sironko, estimates that they have increased the construction cost by UGX 23 billion, or USD 6.4 million (Mafabi 2016).

For example, the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, currently in its USD 130 million third phase (NUSAF 3), has been financed by the World Bank; the Peace, Recovery and Development Programme (PRDP) has been supported by a range of bilateral donors, including the Danish, Irish, Norwegian, and Swedish governments (Daily Monitor 2012b; Irish Times 2012; Observer 2012a and 2012b; Oketch 2016; Relief Web 2009). These donor-funded government projects have been marred by mismanagement and corruption. The Pian County MP Achia Remegio has claimed that “[t]hat money doesn’t reach Karamoja; most of it is swindled in the Office of the Prime Minister in Kampala” (Ssekika 2013; also UO2). As of the time of writing, the World Bank has suspended its financing of NUSAF 3 and other Ugandan government initiatives because of flawed implementation (Oketch 2016). The Danish, Irish, Norwegian, and Swedish governments also temporarily halted direct budget support for the Ugandan government after EUR 12 million of their contributions to the PRDP was stolen by the Office of Prime Minister’s Principal Accountant Kazinda Geoffreyy, possibly in cooperation with the Office’s Permanent Secretary Bigirimana Pius and Janet Museveni (Daily Monitor 2012b; Irish Times 2012; New Vision 2012; Observer 2012a and 2012b). For this reason, some donors have eschewed budget support to directly fund specific initiatives. For instance, Irish Aid has constructed twenty-one primary schools throughout Karamoja, while the World Bank has financed new buildings for the Moroto Referral Hospital. Because the Ugandan government remains responsible for recruitment of medical personnel and teachers and supply of medical equipment, medicines, and teaching materials, however, the new structures are heavily underutilized: the schools are largely empty and Moroto Hospital, much like lower-level government health institutions in Karamoja, is widely considered by potential patients, who shun it in favour of the
Catholic St. Kizito’s Hospital in Matany in Napak District, to be a death trap (Irish Aid 2016; Aruali 2013; Ariong 2015c; UO114).

Global acute malnutrition is above ten percent in all but one district and exceeds emergency thresholds in two districts. 105,720 Karamojans, approximately eleven percent of the population, require treatment for moderate acute malnutrition annually (WFP 2015). As many as 700,000 people need food assistance (compared to 655,000 in 2004, 574,000 in 2005, 500,000 in 2006 and 2007, 700,000 in 2008, 970,000 in 2009, 730,000 in 2010, and 699,000 in 2011; Nakalembe, Dempewolf, and Justice 2016). Dozens, and perhaps hundreds, of Karamojans die from hunger every year (with, for example, 46 people reported dead in 2013, 28 in 2015, and 40 in early 2017; these accounts almost certainly significantly underestimate the number of deaths; Ariong 2015a; Ariong and Emwamu 2013; KFM 2015; Onyanga 2017; UA2). The rate of child anaemia stands at 58.9 percent, and of child stunting—at 36.9 percent. To alleviate children’s malnutrition, the WFP and its partners provide meals for 123,440 students in 282 primary schools in Karamoja.

Natural resource exploitation includes mining undertaken in areas formally under “exploration” licenses, rather than proper mining leases; a loophole in the law allows exploration license holders to remove and export ore without paying royalties (Saferworld 2014).

While it does not disclose its profits, the most established of these operations, Tororo Cement, which relies on limestone from its mining operations on Mount Moroto, is the largest locally-owned taxpayer in Uganda; in 2014, it paid UGX 82 billion (approximately USD 23 million) in taxes (Uganda Business News 2016).

Under Ugandan law, all sub-surface rights belong to the government (which does not hold them in trust for the people, but actually owns them); land owners—or local communities, where customary tenure exists, as is the case almost everywhere in Karamoja outside of towns and natural reserves—are only entitled to three percent of the royalties received by the government from mining operators. In reality, however, only a single So community appears to have actually received compensation for the loss of access to their land, largely due to Lokoru Albert’s efforts, for which the So rewarded him with a seat in parliament (UA5; UO93; UO113; Saferworld 2014 reports that no royalties had been paid to Karamojan communities as of the time of writing). In addition, procedures specified in the Mining Act (2003) are often not followed by investors (UO114). Relatedly, legal protections of customary land tenure are weak and rarely enforced. Government administrators, including—in the few Karamojan districts where they have been appointed—district land officers, have frequently helped both Karamojan and outside buyers to illegally obtain land titles to parcels held in customary tenure by local communities (UO128).

That is, removed from the list of legally protected conservation areas.

Or, as I detail in Part 2, to the subordinate class of Karamojan local leaders.

The mining operations run by DAO and East African Mining, and the human rights violations in which the two companies have been involved, have been documented by the Human Rights Watch, which has not, however, disclosed their connections to Ugandan state managers; HRW 2014.

Includes deaths not caused by UPDF.

Includes deaths not caused by UPDF.

Includes deaths not caused by UPDF.

References


Howe, Kimberly, Elizabeth Stites, and Darlington Akabwai. 2015. “‘We Now Have Relative Peace’; Changing Conflict Dynamics in Northern Karamoja, Uganda.” Medford, Massachusetts: Tufts University.


No author. 2006. “Summary of Forceful Disarmament Incidences and Human Rights Violations in Karamoja.”


---

**Media sources**


http://allafrica.com/stories/201301212507.html


Odyek, John. 2015. “Oil discovery in Karamoja region can help develop it.” New Vision, October, 16.


